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Taxpayers’ Lack of Standing in 
International Tax Dispute Resolutions: 
An Analysis Based on the Hybrid Norms 
of International Taxation 
 
Limor Riza

 
 
Preface 
 
Assume a hypothetical but very plausible scenario in which you had 
invested substantial fortune and efforts in a cross-border transaction. 
You entered this transaction after a thorough field study and you even 
consulted some tax experts in order to estimate your potential tax 
burden. The tax advisors succeeded in calming you down by drawing 
your attention to the fact that the transaction will be carried out in a 
state that has signed a bilateral tax treaty with your resident state. That 
means that you will avoid the problem of double taxation. Willingly you 
carried out the transaction and the outcome is quite successful and even 
exceeded your expectations. You are aware that you have to share your 
success with the tax authorities and pay income tax. Though, suddenly 
you realize that since your transaction is quite complicated and unusual 
both states claim full share and you face double taxation. You know that 
there is a procedure stipulated in the treaty enabling the states to resolve 
problems of double taxation. Now, it is your money at stake, but the two 
contracting states exclude you from their negotiation. To put it gently, 
you are not satisfied with this conduct; you believe it is unfair since it is 
your money and you should have standing in the procedure. I am awfully 
sorry to inform you but I believe you should not. If you are interested to 
know why I believe that you and other taxpayers should not have a 
standing in conflict resolutions arising due to double tax treaties you 
are welcome to read this paper. 
This paper examines whether a taxpayer should have “standing”1 in 
 
 Carmel Academic Center, Haifa, Israel. 
1. "Standing" is a term usually applicable to federal courts, but I analogize it here 
with the right to be heard in international dispute resolutions. See BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1536 (9th ed. 2009). 
1
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international dispute resolutions.  To answer this question the primary 
task is to identify the nature of international taxation.  In other words, 
this paper discusses how to classify the field of international taxation.  Is 
it part of public international law, private international law (i.e., conflict 
of laws), national (domestic) law, or is it a hybrid field that requires 
specific attention?  Making this distinction is vital for resolving disputes 
when a taxpayer is taxed twice for cross-border transactions in cases 
where the double tax convention is unclear and both contracting states 
claim full or partial tax on accrued income.
2
 
In 1924, the Permanent Court of International Justice defined 
dispute as “disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal 
views or of interests between two persons.”3 In the case brought before 
the Court in 1924, it determined that the dispute started between an 
individual and a state, but then the individual’s government “took up the 
case.  The dispute then entered upon a new phase; it entered the domain 
of international law, and became a dispute between two States.”4  If we 
analogize that case to a tax case derived by
 
a cross-border transaction, 
there is no doubt that we have a dispute — a dispute on tax liability.  But 
there are still two lingering doubts. First, is it an international dispute?  
And second, who are the parties to it?  If one examines the current 
mechanisms available in the OECD Model Tax Convention for resolving 
double taxation disputes, one realizes that the taxpayer’s standing is 
somewhat ambiguous.  In order to clarify this ambiguity we need to 
address the question of categorizing the conflict as a national or 
international one. 
The question at stake is whether a taxpayer should be a party to the 
dispute resolution process.  In this paper, the cases cited are limited to 
where double tax treaties apply.  I reserve the cases where they are 
inapplicable to further discussion. 
Part I highlights the tax complexity arising from cross-border 
transactions.  Since the article focuses on OECD Model dispute 
resolution mechanisms, Part II briefly introduces the model’s history and 
 
2. It seems that tax conflicts are inevitable and can be avoided only by super-
national authority as argued in MARIO ZÜGER, ARBITRATION UNDER TAX TREATIES: 
IMPROVING LEGAL PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 3 (2001). 
3. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 
3, at 11 (Aug. 30) [hereinafter Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions]. This verdict 
represents the orthodox approach of diplomatic protection. See Zachary Douglas, The 
Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 151, 165 
(2004). 
4. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, at 11. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/3
 1066 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  34:3 
its official aims.  Part III discusses the available dispute resolution 
mechanism in the OECD Model — the Mutual Agreement Process 
(MAP) and Arbitration.  Part IV reviews the hybrid elements of 
international taxation.  This paper suggests that international taxation has 
both national and international characteristics.  This hybrid nature is the 
basis of the discussion in Part V: after identifying the parties to the 
international tax dispute, this paper suggests two solutions to the research 
question — the apparent and normative solutions.  In the former, a 
taxpayer should have standing in the international dispute, though recall 
that this solution is not based on normative grounds.  The normative 
rationale introduces the equity principle whereby taxpayers should have 
no official role in resolving the dispute.  Finally, this paper offers a brief 
recommendation in Part VI. 
 
I. The Complexity Arising from Cross-Border Transactions 
 
It is commonly accepted that there is an ongoing globalization 
process whereby goods, capital, services, people and ideas move from 
one state to another.  One example is international transactions where a 
foreign corporation engages in economic activities with another 
corporation in a different jurisdiction.  Another very common example is 
multinational enterprises that conduct business worldwide.  Modern laws 
endeavor to resolve disputes arising from these kinds of contemporary 
cross-border transactions. 
One aspect of law relevant to cross-border transactions is tax law or 
more precisely international tax law (though some conflicts may occur 
between one state’s bank secrecy law and another’s tax laws).5  In the 
above example of a corporation doing business in a different jurisdiction, 
it may be liable to double taxation.  Many countries have signed bilateral 
double tax conventions to mitigate this problem.
6
  Those conventions 
regulate how to divide the tax liability between the contracting states. For 
instance, the United States has signed double tax treaties with more than 
sixty countries,
7
 and the United Kingdom with more than 100.
8
  Today, 
 
5. An example is the UBS saga where American tax authorities demanded 
disclosure of American citizens’ bank accounts kept in Swiss banks (UBS). See Charles 
H. Gustafson, The Role of International Law and Practice in Addressing International 
Tax Issues in the Global Era, 56 VILL. L. REV. 475, 475-78 (2011). 
6. This article focuses only on the aim of reducing double taxation and not on the 
other official or unofficial goals of double tax treaties. 
7. See United States Income Tax Treaties – A to Z, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-Businesses/United-States-Income-Tax-
3
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the global network of bilateral double tax treaties exceeds 2,000.
9
 
 
II. Introduction to Double Taxation and the OECD Model Tax 
Convention 
 
In order to answer the first question I need to address the 
classification of the field of international taxation.  This classification has 
little relevance to straightforward cases that raise no particular dilemmas 
for tax division between contracting states.  It is significant, however, in 
tax disputes between a taxpayer and the two contracting states. Today, 
double tax conventions based on either the OECD or the UN model 
include a specific article (Article 25) that establishes a mutually agreed 
procedure for eliminating double taxation and resolving conflicts of 
interpretation.  This procedure invites competent authorities to mutually 
agree to resolve disputes where a taxpayer is subject to taxation that is 
not in accordance with the convention. 
Since state tax laws may conflict in the international arena, a 
taxpayer may be subject to double taxation.  Double taxation could arise 
in various scenarios where a state taxes its residents on extraterritorial 
income.  In the classical example, double taxation occurs when a resident 
of state X generates income in state Y.  State X can tax its resident by 
virtue of its residence-based regime and state Y by virtue of its territory-
based regime. Moreover, double taxation can arise due to double 
“residence” or “territory”. Sometimes countries unilaterally solve the 
problem of double taxation by recognizing a tax relief in national law in 
the form of foreign tax exemption, credit
10
 or deduction.  But in order to 
eliminate or at least mitigate the double tax problem many countries have 
signed bilateral double tax conventions usually based on either the 
OECD or the UN model.  Those models serve as a noncompulsory 
format and negotiation platform between states.
11
  Although the number 
of such treaties is growing,
12
 there is no multinational double tax 
convention as yet.  It seems that because of distinct domestic tax regimes 
 
Treaties---A-to-Z. 
8. See Double Tax Treaties, available at http://www.icaew.com/en/library/subject-
gateways/tax/double-tax-treaties. 
9. See REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 3 (2007); see also Victor Uckmar, Double 
Taxation Conventions, in INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 149 (Andrea Amatucci ed., 2006). 
10. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (the foreign tax credit applied). 
11. See, e.g., Uckmar, supra note 9, at 151. 
12. See, e.g., id. at 149. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/3
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and interests it would be difficult to formulate such a convention.
13
 
As aforesaid, the OECD model is a popular model that serves as the 
basis for many bilateral conventions.  Thus, it has attracted widespread 
scholarly attention.  Therefore, I will use it as my main point of 
reference. 
 
III. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the OECD Model 
 
A.  The Default Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Mutual Agreement  
      Process 
 
Article 25 of the OECD Model stipulates some dispute resolution 
guidelines.  First, Articles 25(1) and 25(2) regulate the procedure where 
taxpayers are taxed not in accordance with the treaty.  Second, Article 
25(3) is designed to resolve difficulties related to the treaty’s 
interpretation and application and solve the problem of lacunas. 
In case Article 25(1) applies, the taxpayer may present his matter to 
“the competent authority of the contracting state of which he is a 
resident”.14  The taxpayer may do so even if he has not exhausted all 
remedies under domestic law.
15
  If the case is justified, the competent 
authority has to endeavor to settle the controversy.
16
  Thus, a prerequisite 
to entering a mutual agreement is that “the objection appears to [the 
competent authority] to be justified . . . .”17  This condition grants the 
competent authority with discretion whether to accept or reject the case.
18
 
 
13. On the difficulties of formulating a multination convention, see paragraph 37 of 
Introduction to the OECD Model Tax Convention.  Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development [OECD], Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, 
I-11, ¶ 37 (July 22, 2010), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-
2010_9789264175181-en [hereinafter OECD, Model Tax Convention]. 
14. Id. at M-59. 
15. See id. at C(25)-12, ¶ 31. 
16. See id. at C(25)-12, ¶ 2. 
17. Article 25(2) of the OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at M-59.  
But see Ehab Farah, Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes: A Solution in 
Search of a Problem, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 703, 717, 734-36 (2009) (Farah criticizes this 
precondition.  Moreover, Farah finds fault with the OECD arbitration article since it fails 
to achieve the two main goals of double tax treaties: preventing double taxation and 
preventing tax avoidance.  Farah suggests a twofold evaluation test: first, a mandatory 
and binding arbitration provision should achieve both goals and second, the provision 
should operate so as to resolve tax disputes). 
18. See, e.g., Hugh Ault, Improving the Resolution of International Tax Disputes, 7 
FLA. TAX REV. 137, 140 (2005). 
5
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If the competent authority cannot overcome the obstacle by itself, it 
should implement the second stage of dispute resolution and resolve the 
case “by mutual agreement with the competent authority of the other 
contracting state . . . .”19  It should be noted that if Article 25 is not 
adopted in a double tax treaty, the taxpayer will be required to bring his 
matter before the judiciaries in both contracting states.
20
  There is a 
parallel authority to deal with the matter: the taxpayer can bring the case 
before a local judiciary and simultaneously present it to his competent 
authority.
21
  If so, the case may reach both a domestic and an 
international resolution.  Problems may arise naturally if the two 
resolutions conflict.  Another possible conflict between domestic and 
international law may easily arise in the application of the mutual 
agreement process.
22
  To avoid conflicts the taxpayer is usually required 
to accept the mutual agreement and to withdraw his relevant domestic 
lawsuit(s).
23
  Another quandary is whether the competent authority is 
bound by its domestic law or free to deviate from it.
24
  Despite its 
importance, however, this issue is beyond the scope of this article. 
The mutual agreement process is the most commonly used 
mechanism.
25
  Nevertheless, it has at least one serious drawback: mutual 
agreement processes can take a long time to complete, and during this 
time new complications may arise.
26
  Moreover, the procedure is costly 
to both the contracting states and the taxpayer.
27
 
Another shortcoming of MAP is where competent authorities follow 
the mutual agreement procedure, but do not have to reach an agreement.  
They are obliged to make their best effort to mutually agree on the case 
but are under no obligation to reach a conclusion: their only duty is to 
negotiate.
28
  This is perhaps the main drawback of the procedure, a 
drawback Article 25(5) has been designed to remedy.  Despite its 
 
19. Article 25(2) of the OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at M-59. 
20. See id. at C(25)-2, ¶ 7. 
21. See id. at C(25)-1, ¶ 2. 
22. See id. at C(25)-10 to -11, 13, 16-17, ¶¶. 27, 35, 42-43 (discussing some other 
examples of conflict between the mutual agreement process and domestic law). 
23. See id. at C(25)-17, ¶ 45. 
24. See Ault, supra note 18, at 140-41. 
25. See Maya Ganguly, Tribunals and Taxation: An Investigation of Arbitration in 
Recent US Tax Conventions, 29 WIS. INT'L L.J. 735, 750 (2012) (Ganguly examines the 
pros and cons of the arbitration mechanism and concludes that, despite its merits, the 
current formulation of arbitration in double tax treaties suffers from many weaknesses). 
26. Id.; see also Ault, supra note 18, at 139. 
27. See id. at 139 (discussing other potential costs). 
28. See OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at C(25)-14, ¶ 37. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/3
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shortcoming the MAP is as aforesaid the default dispute resolution 
mechanism in the OECD Model. 
 
B.  The Second Dispute Resolution Mechanism: Arbitration 
 
Article 25(5) provides for arbitration in disputes originated by 
Articles 25(1)-(2).
29
  It was added to the OECD Model in 2008 after 
lengthy discussions
30
 and it is a quite common dispute resolution 
mechanism in bilateral economic agreements.
31
 
Arbitration is a dispute resolution process settled outside the court.
32
  
The dispute is settled by a neutral third party
 — the arbitrator — who 
adjudicates the disputed issue and his decision is both binding and 
final.
33
 
Article 25(5) added the practice of mandatory arbitration with the 
reservation that “[i]n some states, national law, policy or administrative 
considerations may not allow or justify the type of dispute resolution 
envisaged under this paragraph . . . .”34 The taxpayer may initiate an 
arbitration process if the mutual agreement process fails to end after two 
years.
35
  The arbitration process is available to the taxpayer only when 
 
29.  Id. at C(25)-27, ¶ 73. 
30. Before this amendment some OECD proposals were made.  See OECD, 
Improving the Process for Resolving International Tax Disputes (July 27, 2004), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxtreaties/33629447.pdf [hereinafter OECD, 
Improving the Process]; OECD, Proposals for Improving Mechanisms for the Resolution 
of Tax Treaty Disputes (Feb. 2006), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/disputeresolution/36054823.pdf [hereinafter OECD, Tax Treaty 
Disputes]. 
31. Seventy-five percent of international economic agreements provide for an 
arbitration mechanism.  This percentage is quite high relative to other international 
agreements such as environmental, human rights, and security agreements.  See Barbara 
Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution 
Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 201 (2007). 
32. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (9th ed. 2009). 
33. Id. 
34. See OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at M-60 n.1, C(25)-24, ¶¶ 
65-67; see also William W. Park, Control Mechanisms in International Tax Arbitration, 
in RESOLUTION OF TAX TREATY CONFLICTS BY ARBITRATION 35, 38-39 (1994) (discussing 
the problem of enforcing the arbitral decision).  On the other hand, Park also questions 
the ability to challenge the arbitral decision on grounds of bias, excess of authority or 
refusal to let one party present its case.  Id. 
35. McIntyre challenges this provision by believing that the taxpayer is not party to 
the conflict and thus should not have the right to initiate the arbitration process. If 
awarded this right, then reciprocity requires, at the very least, that competent authorities 
have this right too. Michael J. McIntyre, Comments on the OECD Proposal for Secret 
7
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the competent authority has initiated a mutual agreement process and the 
tax problem has not been mutually resolved.
36
  That means that if 
competent authorities have reached an agreement that is not to the 
taxpayer’s satisfaction, he cannot bring his case to arbitration.  This also 
means that the arbitration process is only applicable for deadlocks and 
naturally for cases which have been initially found justified by the 
competent authority.  Thus, arbitration is inapplicable if the competent 
authority has refused to initiate a mutual agreement process in the first 
place.
37
  Mandatory arbitration has mainly two advantages.  First, it 
forces a solution (since mutual agreement can end in a stalemate); and 
second, it expedites the procedure.
38
 
The arbitration settlement’s validity is somewhat limited.  First, it is 
only binding with regard to the particular matters submitted to 
arbitration.
39
  Second, to avoid conflicting decisions, Article 25(5) states 
that arbitration is not available if a domestic court has already resolved 
the case.
40
 
Although Article 25(5) embraces mandatory arbitration, the precise 
arbitration procedure is not stipulated in the OECD Model, which leaves 
it to mutual decision by the contracting states.  Some believe that it is 
inefficient for arbitrators to set up ad-hoc rules and that more detailed 
guidelines should be provided,
41
 which are absent in the OECD model.  
Indeed, some global organizations and NGOs have been supporting the 
implementation of arbitration in cross-border transactions; these include 
the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”),42 and 
International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”).43  In 2000, the ICC’s 
 
and Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 622, 640 
(2006). See also infra Part V.C. 
36. See Article 25(5) of the OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at M-59 
to 60. 
37. See Farah, supra note 17, at 716, 734-36. 
38. See Gustaf Lindencrona, Recent Development of Tax Treaty Arbitration, in 
RESOLUTION OF TAX TREATY CONFLICTS BY ARBITRATION 3, 8 (1994); see also Züger, 
supra note 2, at 65-108 (on mandatory arbitration). 
39. See OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at C(25)-30, ¶ 83. 
40. See id. at C(25)-28, ¶ 76. In other cases, where the taxpayer is able to take his 
case to domestic court after an arbitral decision, McIntyre believes the taxpayer should 
bear the costs of arbitration and reimburse the competent authorities for wasted resources.  
McIntyre, supra note 35, at 642-43. 
41. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 35, at 641-42. 
42. See THE LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 
http://www.lcia.org/Default.aspx. 
43. See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.iccwbo.org (The ICC 
is an NGO established in 1919 to represent worldwide businesses and serve as the world 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/3
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Commission on Taxation published a policy statement on Arbitration in 
Tax Matters,
 44
 which can be easily adopted in bilateral tax treaties. 
Within the mutual agreement process, other dispute resolutions can 
be implemented on ad-hoc basis in lieu of the arbitration process.
45
  One 
popular alternative is mediation.  Since the OECD Model provides for 
arbitration, however, we shall focus on this dispute resolution 
mechanism in what follows. 
 
C.  The Merits Pros and Cons of Arbitration 
 
For several decades now, scholars and practitioners have been 
interested on how to resolve international tax disputes. Already in the 
1951 Fifth Congress of the International Fiscal Association two main 
mechanisms were suggested: an international judicial tax tribunal and 
arbitration.
46
  This issue was not resolved in this congress and was raised 
again in further discussions.
47
 
This paper is not aimed at weighing the pros and cons of arbitration. 
The aim of this brief, by no means exhaustive discussion is merely to 
illuminate the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration.  For the sake 
of clarity, though, I will briefly elaborate on the matter. 
The merits of arbitration can be compared to the main available 
dispute resolution mechanisms in the international arena – mutual 
agreement and judiciary procedures. Although arbitration is 
supplementary and substitutive of mutual agreement processes a brief 
comparison of the two can highlight its merits. 
Process finalization argument: Arbitration is similar to a judicial 
decision and differs from mutual agreement in that that the conflict 
 
business organization). 
44. Int’l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Policy Statement for Arbitration in 
International Tax Matters (May 3, 2000), http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-
Rules/Document-centre/2002/Arbitration-in-International-Tax-Matters--Bilateral-
Convention-Article/.  Contra OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at C(25)-36 
to -43 (the Annex to Article 25 Commentary titled Sample Mutual Agreement on 
Arbitration provides a sample form of agreement that competent authorities may use as a 
basis for a mutual agreement to implement the arbitration process); but see Park, supra 
note 34, at 48-49 (providing that an international tax arbitration clause should include 
five elements: (1) applicable procedural rules; (2) the mechanism for determining the 
arbitrator fees; (3-4) the place and language of arbitration, and (5) the number of 
arbitrators). 
45. See OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at C(25)-31, ¶86. 
46. Lindencrona, supra note 38, at 3. 
47. Id. 
9
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reaches an award.  In this sense, both arbitration and judiciary processes 
are preferable to mutual agreement process.
48
 
Neutrality argument: In addition, international arbitration is 
preferable to mutual agreement since the outcome is based on an 
independent forum rather than on interested and biased authorities, which 
prioritize the interests of their state.
49
 Independent arbitrators can 
overcome the biased advantage given to the host state, which serves at 
the same time as a “party, regulator, legislator and adjudicator.”50 Where 
large-scale trading and financial activities conducted by multinational 
enterprises are involved, each state has an interest not to lose its 
economic share.
51
 
Although the amendment of the OECD Model’s Article 25 includes 
arbitration as a cumulative dispute resolution mechanism, the more 
material comparison is between arbitration and judiciary procedures as 
discussed below. 
Efficiency argument: One apparent advantage of arbitration is cost 
and time saving
52
 relative to the regular judicial process.
53
  Arbitration is 
free of procedural and evidentiary rules and thus considered an efficient 
dispute resolution mechanism.
54
 Moreover, the arbitral decision is final 
and the parties cannot appeal it, which means it is significantly more 
cost-effective
55
 (albeit at the expense of fairness, as discussed below).
56
  
This apparent advantage is not absolute, however. Recently, significant 
progress has been achieved in allowing some arbitration decisions to be 
 
48. See also id. at 8. 
49. See, e.g., Barry Bracewell-Milnes, Summary of Proceedings of the Seminar 
"Resolution of Tax Treaty Conflicts by Arbitration", in RESOLUTION OF TAX TREATY 
CONFLICTS BY ARBITRATION 61, 62 (1994). 
50. This quotation was mentioned with regard to investment treaty arbitration. See 
Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment 
Treaties: Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & 
POL'Y 47, 71-72 (2005) [hereinafter Franck, The Nature and Enforcement]. 
51. See Allison Christians, How Nations Share, 87 IND. L.J. 1407, 1408 n.4 (2012) 
(It is estimated that sixty percent of global trade is carried out by multinational 
enterprises). 
52. See Park, supra note 34, at 36; Ganguly, supra note 25, at 751-52 (Ganguly 
weighs the pros and cons of arbitration to resolve the double taxation problem and 
believes that, despite the merits of arbitration, its current formulation in double tax 
treaties suffers from many disadvantages). 
53. See supra note 38. 
54. Ganguly, supra note 25, at 746-47. 
55. Id. at 746. 
56. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/3
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appealed.
57
  This is not the normal procedure, but given its availability it 
would be overly simplified to state that arbitration awards are completely 
final. 
Neutrality argument: Another advantage in the international arena is 
the neutral nature of arbitration.  It seems that when a conflict arises 
between taxpayer X, resident of state X, and Y, resident of state Y and 
taxpayer X will often be reluctant to litigate in state Y and vice versa.  
Thus, arbitration is more politically and procedurally neutral.
58
 
Fairness and confidentiality argument: It seems that the Achilles 
heel of the OECD arbitration mechanism is its secrecy.  In other words, 
the main drawback of arbitration and mutual agreement procedures
59
 
compared to judicial procedures is lack of transparency.  The public has 
access to court verdicts and can scrutinize the outcome of the process.
60
  
This not only gives the public a better understanding of the law and its 
implementation, but also provides legal precedents for later disputes.
61
  
Conversely, international tax arbitration is totally obscure from the 
public.
62
  The arbitration process, including its final decision, is not open 
 
57. See, e.g., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, OPTIONAL APPELLATE 
ARBITRATION RULES (November 1, 2013), available at 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2016218. 
58. See Park, supra note 34, at 36. 
59. Most mutual agreement procedure documents in the United States are not open 
to the public (for a more detailed classification of competent authority resolutions, see 
Christians, supra note 51, at 1433-34; McIntyre, supra note 35, at 631 ("The single most 
objectionable feature of the OECD Proposal is its provision for total secrecy.”)). 
McIntyre criticizes the OECD Proposal for Improving Mechanisms for the Resolution of 
Tax Treaty Disputes (2006) mainly for the arbitration process' confidentiality and the 
unnecessarily costly process in cases of double non-taxation, most of which are transfer 
pricing cases which can be dealt within the improved OECD transfer pricing rules. 
McIntyre, supra note 35, at 627-29.  Since arbitration is costly, McIntyre suggests 
limiting the mandatory arbitration mechanism to double taxation cases only and to the 
exclusion of double non-taxation. Id. at 646. He finds no rationale in mandatory 
arbitration in cases that result in increasing international tax avoidance. McIntyre notes 
other flaws in the proposal that can, however, be easily remedied. Id. at 638-46. 
60. See Ganguly, supra note 25, at 751. 
61. This argument is applied to domestic judicial courts, despite being applicable, 
mutatis mutandis, to international judicial courts as well. See Christians, supra note 51, at 
1430-31. 
62. Christians claims that "the international tax arbitration process is designed to be 
completely inaccessible to the public. In other words, international tax arbitration is 
intentionally designed not to produce international tax law." See Christians, supra note 
51, at 1437 (Christians demonstrates how "soft law" in international tax disputes involves 
high social costs. Soft institutional mechanisms in the international tax regime disguise 
relevant information from the public. Citizens of each nation thus lack information about 
the allocation of global revenues. They cannot be aware if their government claims less 
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for disclosure.  When decisions are confidential they cannot guide others 
in future disputes, thus impairing the development of customary law.
63
  
The main counter-argument to this is the efficiency argument discussed 
above.
64
 
Confidentiality has another aspect, though. A confidential 
adjudicative process is a fertile ground for corruption.  When parties 
cannot review the process it is easier to act dishonestly.
65
  This problem 
can be minimized if the parties to the secret process are private self-
interested parties that have an incentive to expose dishonesty when their 
money is at stake.  On the other hand, when the parties are states and the 
money at stake is public funds, this incentive is fairly insignificant.
66
 
Sovereignty argument: Arbitration impairs state sovereignty since 
internal tax revenue decisions are being resolved by third parties — the 
arbitrators.
67
  Since resolving some international tax conflicts requires 
domestic law interpretation, some scholars argue that interpretation 
should be left to domestic courts and not to any international third 
party.
68
  This claim has some truth to it, although it is valid also to MAPs 
and judiciary procedures (even domestic courts) since globalization 
interferes with sovereignty.  On the other hand, since the dispute 
concerns only one taxpayer and only his tax liability and not the truly 
national matters, this interference is somewhat negligible.
69
 
Harmonization v. Inconsistency argument: If one focuses on the 
specific dispute, we have seen that arbitration carries many advantages in 
terms of quick and efficient resolution.  However, if one considers the 
general system beyond the specific individual, an international court may 
be preferable.  Not only can such a court develop legal tax rules as 
discussed under the fairness and confidentiality argument, but its 
byproduct can be tax harmonization.
70
  Though, even for an individual, 
 
of the global income and thus levies them more heavily. Without this relevant 
information, it is impractical to assess tax policy on either efficiency or fairness 
principles. Therefore, the author aims at examining the social cost of obscurity in 
international tax regime). 
63. See Ganguly, supra note 25, at 771; see also McIntyre, supra note 35, at 632. 
64. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. 
65. McIntyre, supra note 35, at 626, 632. 
66. Id. at 626, 636. 
67. See, e.g., Ganguly, supra note 25, at 752; Farah, supra note 17, at 709. 
68. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 35, at 626 (adding that "The OECD seems to 
recognize that an international tribunal should not act as a court of review for the 
decisions of domestic courts."). 
69. Ganguly, supra note 25, at 753. 
70. In Adam H. Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 
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arbitration may be troublesome since there are various arbitral tribunals 
that can reach inconsistent outcomes.  This inconsistency not only 
interferes with harmonization but also with certainty – a vital feature in 
economic activities.
71
 
Some scholars conclude that despite the drawbacks of arbitration,
72
 
it can serve as the appropriate dispute resolution mechanism with some 
modifications.
73
  This article’s basic approach is that no dispute 
resolution mechanism is perfect, and it does not attempt to settle the 
question which mechanism is better on either efficiency or neutrality 
grounds.  Instead, this article examines whether the dispute resolution 
mechanisms proposed by the OECD Model should treat the taxpayer as a 
party to the dispute.  After this discussion this paper may be less 
undecided as to which mechanism is preferable, but in order to answer 
this question, some light needs to be shed on the nature of international 
 
717, 724 (2012), Rosenzweig treats international taxation as a public good and claims it 
is misleading to support greater cooperation between countries in the international tax 
arena.  Bilateral treaties, which mainly exclude small states (often offshore tax havens), 
do not enhance international cooperation. Id. at 721-24.  On the contrary, in excluding 
these tax havens they actually compromise cooperation. Id. at 725.  Therefore, 
Rosenzweig suggests new mechanisms, such as a "lottery" mechanism, to induce those 
small countries to cooperate. Id. at 726, 755-57.  Conversely, in Yariv Brauner, 
Integration in an Integrating World, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 51 (2005), Brauner supports 
international coordination.  According to Brauner, the underlying reason for favoring this 
coordination is the imputation system. Id.  This system is preferable to two-tier taxation.  
Brauner claims that, although many countries have abandoned the imputation system due 
to globalization, the integration system can be reintroduced through international 
coordination of tax policies. Id. at 85-90. Likewise, in Anthea Roberts, Clash of 
Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 45, 62 (2013), Roberts believes that international courts generally have the power 
to create substantive law. 
71. See Franck, The Nature and Enforcement, supra note 50, at 56-58 (This flaw 
was mentioned with regard to bilateral investment treaties); see also Susan D. Franck, 
The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International 
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1525, 1558 (2005) 
[hereinafter Franck, Legitimacy Crisis].  However, Franck notes that inconsistency has 
some advantages, such as highlighting the legal "flaws within the system."  Franck, The 
Nature and Enforcement, supra note 50, at 68; see Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, at 1612-13. 
72. See Farah, supra note 17, at 749 ("Scholars have raised additional concerns 
regarding issues such as the selection of the arbitration panel, implementation of the 
arbitration decision and conflicts with domestic laws, time limitations, precedential value 
of the decisions, taxpayer participation in the proceedings, the binding aspect of the 
decision to the States and to the taxpayer, appointing the arbitrators, review of the 
arbitration decision, the costs and expenses of the proceeding, legal status of the treaty 
and commentary and, the language of the arbitration."). 
73. See Ganguly, supra note 25, at 772; see also McIntyre, supra note 35, at 636-37 
(suggesting seven factors to consider in order to determine whether arbitration is suitable 
as a dispute resolution mechanism). 
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tax law. 
 
IV. The Hybrid Elements of International Taxation and Its Applications 
 
The issue of the appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms in 
international taxation has received wide resonance.
74
  Nevertheless, if we 
wish to design the optimal dispute resolution instrument we have to fully 
understand what international taxation is.  Although the vast literature on 
international taxation is somewhat lacking, recently this topic has 
received attention with regards to investment treaties, discussed below.
75
  
Though, this tax literature attempting to resolve double tax conflicts 
lacks a detailed analysis of classification of international taxation. 
If an international tax regime does exist, is it part of international 
law?
76
  Avi-Yonah believes not only that there is such a regime (partly 
given the numerous and similar bilateral tax treaties), but also that it is 
part of international law.  Avi-Yonah argues that it relies on two 
principles: the single tax principle (meaning that a given income is taxed 
once; no double taxation but also no double non-taxation) and the 
benefits principle (meaning that active income should be taxed at source 
and passive income at residence).
77
  This approach is controversial, 
however, with some scholars believing that there is no international tax 
regime and thus countries are sovereign to adopt any international tax 
rule they prefer.
78
  For the purposes of this article, it will not be 
necessary to determine whether international tax law exists or not, 
though the hybrid form is emphasized. 
Although the categorization of law is somewhat archaic, we still 
tend to classify fields of law to enhance our analysis.  Two common pairs 
of distinctions are between international and national law, and private 
and public international law.  International taxation, or more specifically 
international double tax conventions, carries elements of both 
international and national law, and public and private international law. 
First, in the international arena, tax treaties are tangential to public 
international law, which covers agreements and conventions between 
 
74. See generally Farah, supra note 17; Ganguly, supra note 25; Lindencrona, 
supra note 38; Park, supra note 34. 
75. For the development of investment treaties, see Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, 
supra note 71, at 1525. 
76. See generally AVI-YONAH, supra note 9. 
77. See id. at 9-13, 182. 
78. See references in id. at 1. 
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states (jus inter gentes).  More precisely, international tax treaties are 
conventional international agreements and are thus one of the main 
sources of public international law.  Those treaties are mainly based on 
OECD or UN models and thus share similarities (even in the order of the 
articles).
79
  Moreover, countries have to amend domestic laws in order to 
apply general rules set by the OECD (such as transfer pricing 
guidelines).
80
  Interestingly, although this is beyond the scope of this 
article, some claim that customary international tax law exists.
81
  The 
main justification for a customary international tax regime is that some 
tax rules are ubiquitous.  For example, the nondiscrimination rule 
(Article 24 of the OECD Model)
82
 and the arm’s-length principles 
(adopted in Article 9)
83
 are applicable in international transactions even 
when a double tax treaty is not.
84
 
Second, international tax law also has similarities to private 
international taxation
85
 since it involves, among other factors, a “foreign” 
element, although it is naturally not identical to private international law.  
From the taxpayer perspective it is indeed a private matter that in the 
case of double taxation involves two conflicting tax jurisdictions that can 
govern the dispute.
86
 
Third, international tax law naturally involves domestic law since 
double tax treaties adopt many mechanisms from internal law.  For 
example, taxpayer’s residency is always determined by domestic law87 
(unless there is double residence).
88
  In addition, the treaty becomes part 
of domestic law either automatically (the monism approach) or after a 
process of declaration or ratification (the dualism approach).  According 
to the latter, each country applies different rules on how to adopt a treaty 
into the domestic law.  Nevertheless, eventually the treaty is adopted by 
 
79. See id. at 3. 
80. See, e.g., id. at 4. 
81. See, e.g., id. 
82. See, e.g., id. at 6. 
83. See, e.g., id. at 6-7, 102-23. 
84. Avi-Yonah gives many other examples of tax rules that can be viewed as part of 
customary international law, such as the residence rule and CFC rules.  Id. at 23, 25. 
85. On the interesting historical private-public international law dichotomy in legal 
positivism, see M. W. Janis, Individuals as Subjects of International Law, 17 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 61, 61-64 (1984). 
86. For an example regarding private international law, see JAMES FAWCETT & 
JANEEN M. CARRUTHERS, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sir Peter North ed., 14th ed. 
2008). 
87. See OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at R(19)-31, ¶104. 
88. See id. 
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domestic law and is legally binding. 
As stated above, the tax literature on double taxation lacks a 
thorough analysis of international tax nature.  However, such a 
discussion has been conducted recently alongside the growth
89
 of 
investment treaties (with regard to investment treaties).  Investment 
treaties are officially aimed at encouraging and promoting mutual foreign 
investments between the contracting states.
90
  They encourage the 
transfer of capital between the signatory’s states and contribute mainly to 
host states and private investors.
91
  Investment treaties serve as an 
economic charter for investors by protecting their capital, but they also 
economically assist states to develop their infrastructures.
92
 
Theoretically, when a dispute arises within an investment treaty, the 
potential law that can be used to resolve it may be either the local law of 
the host state, the treaty itself or general principles of public international 
law.
93
  Therefore, some scholars believe that the system generated by 
investment treaties is sui generis.
94
  Because the investor has private 
interests in the success of his investment, investment treaties are a hybrid 
system that absorbs private law into the public sphere.
95
  To put it 
somewhat differently, an international treaty between two sovereign 
states governed by international law embraces to its sphere a private 
dispute.
96
  Some analogizes this composition of laws to a “unique 
marriage” or a “vertical culture clash”.97 
Although I do believe that international tax law is a hybrid system, 
 
89. Since the beginning of the 1990’s, the amount of investment treaties has been 
increasingly growing and amounted to 2,265 treaties in 2003.  Also, during 2002, double 
tax treaties were over 2,000 and totaled to 2,256.  Quantitative Data on Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Double Taxation Treaties, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON 
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT [UNCTAD], 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/
Quantitative-data-on-bilateral-investment-treaties-and-double-taxation-treaties.aspx. 
90. See, e.g., Karen Halverson Cross, Converging Trends in Investment Treaty 
Practice, 38 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 151, 157 (2012); Douglas, supra note 3, at 201; 
see also Preamble to 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf 
(stating that the signatory states desire to achieve greater economic cooperation with 
regard to investments). 
91. Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 71, at 1527. 
92. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement, supra note 50, at 48-49, 52-53. 
93. Douglas, supra note 3, at 194. 
94. Id. at 189. 
95. See, e.g., id. 
96. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement, supra note 50, at 69. 
97. See Roberts, supra note 70, at 54-55 and references therein. 
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as elaborated at the preface of this Part, I suppose we cannot adopt 
directly the analysis concerning investment treaties since it has some 
substantive dissimilarities.  First, the two treaties differ in their direct and 
short-term goals.  Obviously, the resident state signed an investment 
treaty aiming at protecting its resident private investments, though this 
interest is only indirect and depends on how this investment would 
eventually echo its own economy.
98
  When a dispute arises the core issue 
is a private commercial interest.
99
  Whereas, double tax treaties aim at 
reducing double taxation, the interest of the resident state is not directly 
to protect private taxpayers but to preserve the state’s treasury.  Second, 
and also very significant for our later discussion in this paper, investment 
treaties in many cases expressly recognize the independent procedural 
and substantive rights of an investor to resolve his claim in a potential 
dispute.
100
  These similar rights for taxpayers are usually absent from 
double tax treaties.  Third, investment treaties are not necessarily 
bilateral, some are multilateral,
101
 while a double tax treaty is so far only 
a bilateral treaty.  In addition, even when it is bilateral it specifically 
stipulates as aforesaid the parties to the disputes, i.e., a dispute between 
the host state and the private investor not like in double tax treaties. 
Despite the above divergence, international tax disputes are also of 
a special kind.  International taxation is thus an amalgam of different 
legal fields and diverse norms that may involve the interests of 
conflicting states and ultimately taxpayers. 
 
V. De Facto and De Jure Parties to International Tax Disputes 
 
A.  Identifying Conflicting Interests and Parties 
 
Clearly, in an international tax dispute the taxpayer subject to 
double or non-taxation has a vested interest in the outcome of the 
dispute.  Each contracting state also has an economic interest in the 
dispute resolution process since it is supposed to safeguard its state 
treasury. 
In the international arena, therefore, the conflict may be tripartite — 
between both contracting states, and between the taxpayer and each 
 
98. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 3, at 172. 
99. See, e.g., id. at 237. 
100. See discussion infra notes 127-30. 
101. Roberts, supra note 70, at 53; see discussion infra note 109. 
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state.
102
  The conflict resolution mechanisms currently offered in the 
OECD Model Convention treats the problem mainly as a procedural one 
between states
103
 and grants only the taxpayer the right to initiate 
procedures by: first, mutual agreement procedures where he serves only 
as an observer
104
 and second, arbitration where he may present his case 
but not choose the arbitrators.  The taxpayer is a participant who may 
submit his case in writing and can be orally heard before the 
arbitrators.
105
  Moreover, he is not authorized to sue either state for 
violating or breaching a certain article.
106
  To be even more precise, the 
arbitration process commences only when a mutual agreement process 
has been initiated. Recall that this process is subject to the full 
discretionary power of the competent authorities.  In that respect, the 
taxpayer’s role in dispute resolution is fairly passive although he is an 
integral part of the conflict.  On the other hand, in some bilateral 
investment treaties taxpayers who believe that the hosting country has 
 
102. See Luc Hinnekens, Legal Sources and Interpretation of European Tax 
Arbitration Convention and its Recognition of the Taxpayer, in RESOLUTION OF TAX 
TREATY CONFLICTS BY ARBITRATION 11, 25 (1994) (Hinnekens treats the dispute as 
"almost a tri-party procedure" and endeavors to define taxpayer's rights on the basis of 
the European Tax Arbitration Convention); see also Christians, supra note 51, at 1423 
(Christians claims, "[i]t also demonstrates that there are several parties to an international 
tax dispute that have different stakes in the outcome, namely, the taxpayer and the 
multiple governments that have laid justifiable, if overlapping, jurisdictional claims."). 
103. See Hinnekens, supra note 102, at 25 (contending that the question of 
taxpayer's legal position is not relevant in mutual agreement procedure but only in 
arbitration where the issue is not merely diplomatic but also has a jurisdictional nature). 
104. "The taxpayer initiates an international tax dispute by bringing a claim to a 
competent authority, but it is the competent authorities alone that directly engage in the 
dispute and its resolution.  The taxpayer is interested in having the governments resolve 
the problem, but once the claim has been laid, the taxpayer's role becomes one of 
observer, at best."  Christians, supra note 51, at 1424. 
105. See OECD, Tax Treaty Disputes, supra note 30, at ¶ 76 ("Whilst the mutual 
agreement procedure involves a government-to-government relation, when the process 
moves to arbitration, the person who presented the case is more of a direct participant. 
This is especially the case since the arbitration decision will be binding on each State as 
regards the taxation of that person. Thus, it seems appropriate that the person be able to 
participate to some degree directly in the arbitration process, though the process would 
remain under the control of the competent authorities.").  Moreover, section 11 of the 
Annex to Article 25 Commentary titled "Sample Mutual Agreement on Arbitration" 
states: "The person who made the request for arbitration may, either directly or through 
his representatives, present his position to the arbitrators in writing to the same extent that 
he can do so during the mutual agreement procedure. In addition, with the permission of 
the arbitrators, the person may present his position orally during the arbitration 
proceedings". OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at C(25)-40, ¶ 11. 
106. Christians, supra note 51, at 1423. 
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compromised their investment are authorized to sue it directly.
107
 
It is interesting to see that in the investment treaty arena the direct 
conflict is bilateral but not necessarily between contracting states.  Some 
investment treaties treat the conflict as a conflict between the two 
contracting states;
108
 but many others consider the conflict as a conflict 
between the investor of one contracting state and the host state.
109
  
Therefore, despite treating the second alternative as a bilateral conflict, it 
is a conflict between a private person and a sovereign state (the host 
state).  Investment treaties grant investors with some substantive rights 
and procedural rights to “address violations of those substantive 
rights”.110  Investment treaty arbitration in that case is carried out 
between unequal parties where the investor is usually the one who 
initiates the arbitral procedure.
111
 
 
B.  The Apparent Solution 
 
After indicating the interests of the parties at stake, we should 
readdress Article 25.  Article 25 considers the conflict as bilateral and 
regulates the procedure between states.
112
  Apparently, though, the 
proposed resolution mechanisms do not approach the conflict as it should 
be.  First, it should be treated as trilateral and second, it should take into 
account the fact that encompasses elements from both public and private 
inter-national law (and not mainly from public international law). 
The dispute is not merely a matter of contracting states disputing 
how to allocate revenues between them.  It also involves the taxpayer 
(either an enterprise or an individual). Eventually it is the latter which 
bears the burden of double taxation.
113
 
If we accept that the international tax conflict is multiform and 
 
107. See Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 435, 435 (2009); Christians, supra note 51, at 1423; see 
also AVI-YONAH, supra note 9, at 1. 
108. As referred by Douglas the "state/state sphere."  See Douglas, supra note 3, at 
189. 
109. As referred by Douglas the "investor/state sphere."  Id. Most treaties recognize 
investor rights to bring directly an arbitral claim. Roberts, supra note 70, at 50. 
110. See Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 71, at 1529; Roberts, supra note 70, 
at 60. 
111. See Anna T. Katselas, Do Investment Treaties Prescribe a Deferential 
Standard of Review?, 34 MICH. J. INT'L L. 87, 89 (2012). 
112. See Lindencrona, supra note 38, at 5. 
113. See Hinnekens, supra note 102, at 11. 
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carries elements from both international and national law and from both 
public and to some extent private international law, we have to examine 
whether the taxpayer has standing in each legal field.  In other words, the 
question is whether the taxpayer has the “right to make a legal claim or 
seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right”.114 
Needless to say, if we consider the tax conflict as a domestic or 
private international law conflict, then a taxpayer has standing — he can 
easily demonstrate that he will suffer financially if the dispute resolution 
outcome does not redress double taxation.  In both legal fields, 
individuals have private interests in the matter and can bring their case 
before national courts.  Naturally, after meeting some procedural 
requirements taxpayers can sue the tax authorities in domestic courts.  
The problem may arise in public international law, however. 
Recall that double tax treaties also carry elements of international 
law.  Although individuals have some role to play in international law, 
traditionally its subjects have been only states.  Gradually the scope of 
subjects of international law has been growing.  Especially after World 
War II new actors entered into the international arena.
115
  As a result, 
modern public international law recognizes that individuals may be also 
independent subjects thereof.
116
  This means that individuals have legal 
personality in international law, mainly, though not exclusively, in the 
human rights area.
117
  We may thus conclude that in both legal fields at 
stake — the national and international — the taxpayer has certain rights 
to be heard. 
This conclusion is, however, somewhat misleading since the scope 
of individual rights and obligations in the international sphere is 
somewhat limited.  It should be emphasized that I do not claim that in 
international law there is complete overlap between being a subject and 
being a court party of international law.  Still in the international field, 
 
114. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1536 (9th ed., 2009) for definition of 
"standing". 
115. See Janis, supra note 85. 
116. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (6th ed. 2008) (As Shaw 
states "[p]ersonality in international law necessitates the consideration of the 
interrelationship between rights and duties afforded under the international system and 
capacity to enforce claims…. International personality is participation plus some form of 
community acceptance."). 
117. See, e.g., id. at 258; see also Marek St. Korowicz, The Problem of the 
International Personality of Individuals, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 533, 535 (1956) (claiming that 
"[t]he subjects of international law may be defined as persons to whom international law 
attributes rights and duties directly and not through the medium of their states."). 
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not only are individuals not always able to sue,
118
 but in many cases even 
the case cannot be brought by other parties to any international court.  
Nevertheless, as already mentioned, this tendency is changing mainly in 
the human rights area, where it would seem that individuals are 
increasingly considered to have both obligations and rights deriving from 
general international rules.
119
  In some instances individuals can even 
take the case directly to court.  This has been possible since the 1998 
European Convention on Human Rights, which authorizes individual 
victims to sue the violent member state in the European Court of Human 
Rights.
120
  Since the court’s establishment more than 10,000 judgments 
have been given
121
 (this individual right to sue is also granted before the 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights).122  Some claim that this 
progress should also expand to obligations in civil international law.
123
  It 
should be noted, that some scholars believe that individual’s independent 
standing in investment disputes derives from the field of human rights.
124
 
Since the inclination in international law is to expand individual 
rights and since there is a growing tendency to recognize individual 
rights in international sphere, one can claim that this tendency should be 
expanded also to international tax law. 
 
118. As Shaw notes "[i]ndividuals as a general rule lack standing to assert 
violations of international treaties in the absence of a protest by the state of nationality, 
although states may agree to confer particular rights on individuals which will be 
enforceable under international law, independently of municipal law." SHAW, supra note 
116, at 258. 
119. See Andrew Clapham, The Role of the Individual in International Law, 21 
EUR. J. INT'L L. 25, 27 (2010). 
120. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art 34, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221. ("The Court may 
receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation [sic] or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties 
of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto.  The High Contracting 
Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right."). 
121. Over 150,000 applications have been brought before the judicial formation 
(the pre-judicial stage).  See In Facts and Figures 2011, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS. (Jan. 2012), 
available at 
http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/content/blurb/files/FAITS_CHIFFRES_EN_JAN2
012_VERSION_WEB.pdf. 
122. The court was officially founded in 2006 by virtue of the Protocol of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court 
on Human and Peoples' Rights. African Court in Brief, AFRICAN COURT OF HUMAN AND 
PEOPLES' RIGHTS, http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/about-the-court/brief-
history. The Court is bound to protect the rights adopted by the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights.  Id.; see also, Clapham, supra note 119, at 28. 
123. Clapham, supra note 119, at 28. 
124. See, e.g. , Douglas, supra note 3, at 185-86. 
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This conclusion receives wide support from the investment treaty 
literature, which bears some similarities to double tax treaties.
125
  It is 
claimed that since investment treaties carry elements from both 
international and national law and private and public law it creates a new 
unique system.
126
  When a dispute arises within the investment treaty 
scope, one can differentiate between two spheres: a conflict between two 
states or a conflict between a state and a private investor.
127
  Today, 
investment treaties assign investors a direct and independent right in 
international disputes.  In the private-state sphere the investor is a direct 
party with full standing in the dispute resolution.
128
  If the host state did 
not fulfill its obligations and damaged his investment, the investor has a 
personal right to bring a claim against the tortfeasor, i.e., the host state.  
The investor here is analogized to a “private attorney general”129 since a 
private person from the resident state may carry out by himself an 
international dispute against the host state.
130
 
In the short run we saw that the individual taxpayer has incentives 
to be party to the dispute.  He has an incentive to be heard and influence 
the outcome.  In the long run it is not simply the interest of the specific 
taxpayer but also of potential future taxpayers who may face a similar 
double taxation problem.  Ignoring the taxpayer’s direct interests in this 
conflict may deter some businesses from carrying on international 
 
125. Though the two kind of treaties also differ from each other see the discussion 
infra note 97. 
126. See, e.g., id. at 185-86, 189, 193; Roberts, supra note 70, at 50 (In this article, 
Roberts criticizes the common paradigms in investment treaty analysis.  In order to 
understand the nature of investment treaties, it is common to compare it to other legal 
fields.  The ordinary analogies are taken for example from public international law, 
international commercial arbitration law, domestic public law (including administrative 
and constitutional laws) and international public law (including human rights and trade 
law).  Each of them has pros and cons in analyzing investment treaties.  These paradigms 
do not fall in line and in many instances collide due to different structure, assumptions 
and inherent norms). 
127. Douglas, supra note 3, at 189. 
128. See, e.g., Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the 
Present Backlash Against the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 491, 498 
(2009).  Kaushal reviews the historical development of investment treaty arbitration.  
Kaushal reveals that states gave up their sovereignty in order to enhance investor rights 
and property rights.  Kaushal argues that this outcome blurred the distinction between 
national and international law and between private and public law.  Id. at 514-23.  
Additionally, Kaushal claims that this blur between the private and the public sphere 
caused part of the public sphere to privatize and thus to reduce private rights.  Id. at 519-
32. 
129. See, Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 71, at 1538. 
130. Id. 
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economic activity.  Protecting the individual taxpayer should concern 
both contracting states, as both are interested in promoting economic 
growth and efficiency.  The remaining question is whether we need to 
treat him as a party to do so. 
 
C.  The Normative Solution 
 
So far I assumed the taxpayer has a legitimate interest to be heard in 
the “international” dispute.  In other words, I assumed he is a third active 
party.  From an institutional perspective he is a third party and naturally 
the resolution impacts him primarily and directly.  Accordingly, he 
should have full standing since his rights are recognized and protected 
not only in national law where he can sue tax authorities but also within 
the scope of international law.  This analysis was based on the 
presumption that double tax treaties are amalgam of various legal fields.  
But does he really have standing?  Some scholars believe that due to the 
extraneous interests of the business community he is a “non-party” and 
should be only an observer.
131
  The OECD proposal addresses this 
question too, stating that the taxpayer should participate in the arbitration 
process though the process will only be conducted by the signatory 
states.
132
  I too believe that in many cases he should not appear before the 
court as a third interested party, but my reasoning differs. 
It is true that international tax conflicts involve hybrid 
characteristics of both national and international law.  The discussion so 
far excluded a normative perspective.  The approach was institutional, 
assuming that since an individual can be party to a dispute in both 
international and national law and since he naturally has an interest in the 
outcome, he should have standing.  Both legal spheres support and 
recognize the private rights of a person – the taxpayer. 
However, if one introduces to the international tax discourse 
equitable rationales well established in legal tradition, the apparent 
solution will no longer be valid.  If we introduce the discourse of 
principles and if the overarching objective is to prevent double taxation 
and even double non-taxation, we will reach a different conclusion where 
a taxpayer has no say in the dispute. 
The first task is to present the relevant international principles. One 
 
131. See McIntyre, supra note 35, at 639-40. 
132. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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major principle governing international law is good faith,
133
 as articulated 
in Article 2(2) of the United Nations Charter.
134
  This principle is 
elaborated
135
 in the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States.
136
  Thus, 
the principle of good faith should be applicable to meeting an existing 
obligation.
137
 
The principle derived from the above declaration is the duty of 
states to cooperate.  Although this duty is broad
138
 it can highlight the 
duty of contracting states to negotiate in the case of the mutual 
agreement process discussed above.  It can guide the contracting states 
not only to negotiate but also to endeavor in good faith to cooperate and 
reach a conclusion.  Another international principle is the equity 
principle introduced by international courts;
139
 although, “[e]quity has 
been used by the courts as a way of mitigating certain inequities, not as a 
method of refashioning nature to the detriment of legal rules.”140 
The good faith and equity principles are relevant to the discussion 
here.  Good faith is a vague concept that defies straightforward 
definition.  Since it is an equitable principle,
141
 though, I will refer to 
both jointly as “the outer equitable principle”. 
In the private arena and more specifically in the domestic tax field, 
the equity principle was interpreted as the ability-to-pay principle.  
Although not controversial per se,
142
 the contents of equity under tax law 
attracted significant attention in the literature.  The prevailing principle 
 
133. SHAW, supra note 116, at 103-04. 
134. UN Charter art. 2, para. 2 ("All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the 
rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations 
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter."). 
135. SHAW, supra note 116, at 104. 
136. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. 
A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
137. SHAW, supra note 116, at 104. 
138. VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (2007). 
139. SHAW, supra note 116, at 105-07. 
140. Moreover, "[i]ts existence, therefore, as a separate and distinct source of law is 
at best highly controversial."  Id. at 107. 
141. In explaining the concept of "good faith" under Section 205 of the Restatement 
(Second), Summers suggests that this concept ". . . is of a piece with explicit 
requirements of 'contractual morality' such as the unconscionability doctrine and various 
general equitable principles."  See Robert S. Summers, General Duty of Good Faith – Its 
Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 811 (1982) (footnotes 
omitted). 
142. See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 12 
(2002). 
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applied both in scholarly discussion and in practice,
 143
 designed to 
accomplish the equity goal, is the ability-to-pay principle.
144
  The essence 
of this principle is that tax liability should follow individual well-being.  
A well-off person should pay more taxes than a poor person. Utilitarian 
views tried to conceptualize the ability-to-pay principle
145
 in at least two 
ways.
146
  First, a person with higher income can pay more taxes since his 
marginal utility from money diminishes.  Second, a person with high 
income is able to sacrifice a larger portion of his income, since he simply 
has more to spend than the poor.  The ability-to-pay principle was 
interpreted into tax law by progressive tax rates – people with higher 
income are subject to higher tax rates. Thus, the principle should guide 
policy makers in designing tax rules, and as it reflects equitable treatment 
among taxpayers, I refer to it as the “inner equitable principle”. 
If one seeks to accomplish an equitable result according to both the 
outer and inner equitable principles, the taxpayer should not have a “de 
jure standing”.  The analysis rests on the assumption or even the axiom 
that contracting states are obliged to reduce double taxation and trusted 
to act accordingly. As explained in the foreword to the OECD Model the 
main aim of bilateral double tax treaties is to overcome the well-known 
distortive effect of double taxation in international transactions.  And as 
stated, “[t]his is the main purpose of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
on Income and on Capital, which provides a means of settling on a 
uniform basis the most common problems that arise in the field of 
international judicial double taxation.”147 
An example can clarify this claim.  Let us assume that person X, a 
citizen and resident of state X, generates income in state Y.  Both states 
have signed a double tax treaty based on the OECD Model.  If State X 
applies the residence-based regime and State Y does not exempt income 
produced in its territory from tax, a classical double taxation problem 
will arise.  Let us moreover assume that this is a case of full double 
 
143. For the prevalence of the ability-to-pay principle, see id. at 20. 
144. See, e.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S 
GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 61-66 (4th ed. 2008). 
145. John G. Head, Tax-Fairness Principles: A Conceptual, Historical, and 
Practical Review, in FAIRNESS IN TAXATION 10 (Allan M. Maslove ed. 1993). 
146. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 142, at 24. 
147. See OECD, Model Tax Convention, supra note 13, at I-1, ¶ 3 and RICHARD E. 
ANDERSEN, ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES ¶¶ 1.01-1.01[1] (2013), 
which states that there are two main purposes for double tax treaties.  The first is to 
overcome the double tax problem to facilitate cross border trade and the second to enable 
the contracting states to enforce tax collection. 
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taxation. For simplification, we can also assume that the income incurred 
is one hundred dollars and the tax rate on this income in each state is a 
flat tax of thirty percent.  So his tax liability in each state is thirty dollars. 
Therefore cumulatively he will be required to pay sixty dollars in tax 
(meaning paying the tax twice). Applying the inner equitable principle 
means that it is inequitable to tax the taxpayer twice for the same income.  
Moreover, if states are fully committed to cooperating and eliminating 
double taxation and implementing the outer equitable principle, the 
taxpayer has nothing to contribute.  If both countries in my example are 
compelled to reduce double taxation and divide between them thirty 
dollars — the taxpayer has nothing to contribute to the discussion.  It is 
merely a conflict between the contracting states on how to allocate the 
tax among them, with the proviso that the taxpayer should be taxed only 
once according to the inner equitable principle, i.e., to his ability to pay. 
If the case at stake is not a double taxation but rather a double non-
taxation case the analysis should remain the same. If a taxpayer 
structures his transaction in a manner that takes advantage of the 
different tax rules of state X and Y he may benefit from low taxes or 
even avoid taxation altogether (i.e., double non-taxation). This tax 
arbitrage also means that the taxpayer is not taxed with accordance to his 
ability and that states should determine between themselves (perhaps 
with the help of arbitrators)
148
 how to fully tax him and allocate his 
liability between them.  Here again, the relevant parties are only the 
contracting states.  The problem that may arise, though, is that according 
to the current OECD model, the taxpayer is the only one empowered to 
launch the arbitral process.  Since, as I claim, he has no de jure standing, 
the taxpayer should be deprived of the right to initiate the arbitral 
process, which should be left to the contracting states. 
To conclude, each state is obliged by its own jurisdiction and norms 
to implement the inner equitable principle; each state is also obliged to 
implement the outer equitable principle when the state is party to an 
international case.  Since international tax disputes carry both national 
and international elements, both principles should be employed.  If the 
tax dispute reaches a MAP then the contracting states ought to follow 
those principles by themselves.  If, on the other hand, the conflict reaches 
international arbitration or judiciary this task is left to either the 
international arbitrators or the judges.  In any case, due to its hybrid 
nature, the international tax conflict should be resolved according to both 
 
148. For the advantages of arbitration, see supra Part III.C. 
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the inner and outer equitable principles.  The discussion so far stipulates 
the parties to the dispute, though has been salient with regard to the 
proper dispute resolution mechanism. 
 
VI. Food for Thought 
 
The foregoing discussion suggests one recommendation.  After 
arguing that a taxpayer’s active participation in an international tax 
dispute resolution process is unnecessary I could have stopped at that.  
The other (state) parties required to uphold the normative equity 
principle could reach a proper resolution.  However, you may recall the 
discussion in an earlier part where I compared the pros and cons of 
arbitration relative to MAP and the judicial process.  If we ignore the 
technical (though not unimportant) matter of financing a tax tribunal (or 
even a permanent arbitrator panel) and after comparing the various 
international tax conflict resolution mechanism and taking into account 
the hybrid character of international taxation, I believe that a body 
composed of tax experts is the preferable dispute resolution mechanism.  
I believe that such a body could better implement the tax norms 
(including the inner and the outer equitable principles) than 
representatives of the tax authorities of the contracting states in an MAP. 
Accordingly, a body composed of tax experts — either a tax 
tribunal or an arbitrator panel – is preferable to MAP.  But could we 
argue in favor of one of the bodies?  Could we tip the scales in the 
lengthy discussion in favor of one of the above-mentioned mechanisms?  
Recall the former characterization of international taxation.  Part IV 
discussed the hybrid elements of international taxation.  Apparently, this 
classification contributed to my discussion by examining the taxpayer’s 
active participation in dispute resolution.  The apparent solution 
indicated that the taxpayer should be an active participant in the process; 
however, this apparent solution was overruled by the normative analysis.  
But if I return to the question that has troubled many scholars — which 
dispute resolution mechanism is preferable for resolving international tax 
conflicts — the analysis should lead in the opposite direction.  If I ignore 
for the sake of discussion the taxpayer’s participation in the process and 
focus only on the arbitration-versus-adjudication issue, then the 
normative aspect so vital to my analysis will lose its relevance.  If we are 
dealing with tax experts — either arbitrators or judges — who are able to 
internalize the equity principle in their ruling, then both are equally 
qualified from a normative perspective and the normative analysis loses 
27
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its relevance.  The technical solution, however, based directly on the 
hybrid form of international taxation can shed further light on the 
discussion and favor a permanent tribunal (rather than an ad-hoc 
arbitration).
149
  A permanent tribunal can enhance the international 
quality of international taxation by developing customary law and as a 
byproduct promote tax harmonization.  An ad-hoc body that also does 
not disclose its decisions cannot produce and uphold international tax 
law.
150
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
After briefly noting the hybrid elements of international tax treaties, 
I discussed the normative question.  How should we resolve disputes 
when a double tax treaty does not help a taxpayer avoid double taxation 
and both contracting states insist on their complete share?  I suggest that 
this normatively hybrid legal field deserves a different analysis to resolve 
the conflicting private and national interests involved.  I believe that the 
response to this question is crucial for identifying the genuine parties to 
cross-border tax disputes.  The typical international tax dispute is 
tripartite in that it involves the interests of both contracting states and the 
taxpayer.  After identifying the tripartite nature of such disputes and 
noting that both international and national law safeguard individual 
rights the apparent solution would seem to be that the individual taxpayer 
should be party to the dispute. 
However, this is not a well-founded solution since it is only 
procedural and lacks normative insight.  When one considers also the 
normative aspect, the apparent solution is no more valid.  The normative 
discussion is guided by equitable norms accepted both in international 
and national law.  If one accepts that the primary goal of double tax 
treaties is indeed to eliminate or at least reduce double taxation and if 
states are trusted to accomplish this objective, then active taxpayer 
participation in resolving the international tax dispute becomes 
unnecessary.  Thus, to conclude, if indeed dispute resolution aims at 
 
149. This recommendation absorbs one feature from the proposal stipulated by 
Franck with regard to investment treaties: the body's permanency.  Franck supports the 
"establishment of an independent, permanent appellate body with the authority to review 
awards rendered under a variety of investment treaties."  Franck supports the arbitration 
process but suggests a permanent appellate body.   See Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra 
note 71, at 1525, 1617-25. 
150. See the fairness argument discussed supra Part III.C. 
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preventing double taxation (or non-taxation) the genuine parties are only 
the signatory states. 
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